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Greenland is an enormous hunk of ice, three times as big as Texas, with a narrow 
fringe along the southern shore where a few Eskimos and fewer Caucasians scratch 
out an existence. During World War II the United States spread a protecting wing 
over this inhospitable territory … Greenland groans under a ponderous icecap that 
leaves only a slim margin of land sticking out around the edges.
(Roucek 1951, 239)
In 1951, the American sociologist, Joseph Roucek (1951) penned an essay 
entitled “The geopolitics of Greenland” for the Journal of Geography. Although 
not formally trained in geography, Roucek was, for the next forty years, an 
enthusiastic producer of short articles purporting to chart and track the geopolitics 
of the Arctic and the Antarctic, as well as other places such as central and eastern 
Europe and the Mediterranean. Indeed, in another piece, “The geopolitics of 
the Arctic”, published in 1983, he drew attention to the region’s potentially rich 
resources and its strategic military significance as an air route and waterway, 
referring to “Arctic fuels” as a way of reducing North American dependence on 
oil from the Arabian Gulf. “The ‘Arctic Mediterranean’”, he wrote, “is a perfect 
example of an area in which technological advances, especially in aviation, have 
caused far-reaching changes which force a new evaluation of locational factors of 
the region.” (Roucek 1983, 463)
In “The geopolitics of Greenland”, Roucek was at pains to make information 
and knowledge about the geographical location, size and geomorphological 
features of the island accessible to a North American readership, but in doing 
so he ignored the human–environmental relations nurtured and enacted in the 
dynamic surroundings of an ever-changing Arctic over several thousand years. 
roucek simplified its people as those only intent on “scratching out an existence” 
on the margins of an enormous ice sheet. There is little sense of Greenland as 
both a lively and lived space, in which human life engages with the more than 
human entities which constitute that world, and where local, national and global 
connections, dialogues and forces coalesce and collide. For Roucek, Greenland is, 
to echo Anna Tsing’s (2000) phrasing, a place without “friction”.
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The notion of an icecap being “ponderous” chimes serendipitously with recent 
work on how glaciers are part of local and indigenous worldviews and are subject 
to cultural framing (Cruikshank 2004; Orlove et.al. 2008), although Roucek may 
not have had this in mind. To him, the Greenland ice sheet appears to be a burden – 
the land “groans” under its weight and the mass of ice emphasises the inhospitable 
nature of this Arctic territory. And yet that very weight and extent of ice also signals 
strategic possibility for an extra-territorial party, namely the United States. Roucek 
was one of many commentators of the time in whose work one finds an evocation 
of the “desert-like” nature of Greenland, a space with meagre resources making 
it appear empty and devoid of potential for sustained habitation to non-residents 
(pace Said 1993). Geopolitically, though, Roucek’s attitude towards Greenland 
reflects a prevailing view that later American interest in Greenland was shaped by 
the experiences of World War II, and the move by the Danish administration in 1941 
(or more appropriately, the Danish ambassador to Washington Henrik Kauffmann) 
to sign a defence agreement and allow an American presence in Greenland. In his 
Greenland essay, Roucek also pointed to the strategic importance of air routes and 
waterways, which he reiterated in “The geopolitics of the Arctic”. Greenland’s 
strategic importance during World War II lay not in the possibilities it provided for 
a northwards mapping and discovery, or access to its resources, but in its position 
on a North Atlantic stepping stone route for bombers and, critically, for its role 
in weather forecasting. Several American installations were built during the war, 
including three air bases – at narsarsuaq in south Greenland, Kangerlussuaq on the 
west coast, and Ikateq near Ammassalik on the east coast.
As Roucek observed, Greenland’s ice sheet was also attracting renewed 
scientific interest, especially in its role in northern hemisphere climate patterns. 
“Scientists,” he wrote, “have long suspected that Greenland’s icecap manufactures 
much of the bad weather that sweeps over Europe and perhaps the entire northern 
hemisphere. But to verify this theory, they needed on-the-spot reports of icecap 
weather conditions”. An object of scientific enquiry since the nineteenth century, 
Janet Martin-Nielsen describes how the ice sheet became central to Cold War 
science diplomacy (Martin-Nielsen 2013). Interest in the ice sheet’s age, 
thickness and history was closely related to wartime and Cold War strategic 
concerns with weather, ocean currents and sea ice. This blending of the scientific 
and strategic and the geopolitical and geophysical was to be further nourished by 
new expeditions, notably the Expéditions polaires françaises (EPF), and later US 
military investment in glaciological research in Greenland (Martin-Nielsen 2012).
Our chapter is a material, volumetric and discursive intervention into, onto and 
across Greenland including its ice mass and surrounding seas. It is not a friction-
free encounter, but one where the “geo” in geopolitics is scrutinised. Our advocacy 
of a critical Arctic geopolitics is one rooted in materiality where the Arctic is not 
simply a backdrop to human events. Rather we advance an interest in how the 
materiality of the waters, ice, snow, rock, wind and air of the Arctic becomes 
available for further geopolitical manifestations. As Elizabeth Grosz (2008) has 
written on the subject of geopower, the Arctic might be conceived as something 
that also challenges and even subverts the geopolitical, cartographic and scientific. 
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Following on from that discussion of a critical Arctic geopolitics, we explore how 
Greenland’s ice sheet was an essential, if at times recalcitrant, accomplice to US 
and Danish Cold War geopolitical performances and practices. An environment 
in other words that was capable of challenging and undermining the materials, 
sites and modalities actors such as the US military brought to bear on it. We then 
move on to consider another form of materiality and what might be a volumetric 
geopolitics, in this case the Arctic ocean seabed and the efforts by the Geological 
Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS) to map and chart outer continental 
shelves, including those stretching towards the North Pole (Dodds 2010; 
Strandsbjerg 2012). Seabed mapping off Greenland’s continental shelf illustrates 
how this accompanies claims for sovereign rights to be extended hundreds of 
miles from Greenland’s coastline. In both cases, separated by five decades, was 
the issue of how far down (i.e. how thick) and how far out (i.e. how wide) did 
Greenland actually extend. Greenland as territory, as a consequence, exhibits and 
expresses itself, as a process rather than outcome and an unstable volume rather 
than a static and flat surface. To reinforce this point about Greenland being in a 
continuous state of becoming (nuttall 2015), we finish with a consideration of the 
creation of resource spaces and the Greenland frontier. This explicitly material 
and volumetric accounting of Greenland and its geopolitics show how we might 
approach a more critical form of Arctic geopolitics, emphasising the vitality of the 
“geo” in the discursive qualities of Arctic geopolitics (Clark 2013).
Going volumetric: critical Arctic geopolitics
Before we drill into Greenland’s icy core or descend into its depth-like qualities, 
we contemplate this chapter’s analytical optic. Rising interest in the Arctic’s 
(changing) geographical qualities informs much of which is to follow. From 
speculation over the future of Arctic sea ice and its complete disappearance (at 
least in the summer season) to reflection over the region’s resource potential, many 
scholars and commentators have mused on various Arctic futures. It is now taken 
for granted that the region is geographically dynamic and it has been framed, 
mapped, imagined and projected in a myriad of ways, many of which resonate with 
current concern with humans as agents of geophysical transformation and rupture. 
The Arctic as resource frontier, endangered homeland, unique ecosystem under 
threat, epicentre of and for climate change and zone of great power rivalries and 
rising international interest are just some of the framings used in this conversation 
about regional futures. As Brunn and Medby conclude:
Petroleum potentials, mineral riches, shipping lanes, and national strategies 
are often at the fore of geopolitical accounts of the circumpolar North, but 
Arctic spatiality can by no means be reduced to the sum of these parts. “The 
Arctic” is many different things at once: a frontier, a homeland, a highway, 
a stage, a laboratory. It is a space that has intrigued people for centuries and 
continues to do so today.
(Bruun and Medby 2014, 915)
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We argue that the Arctic might also be thought of in explicitly volumetric terms 
and, by peering within, above and around and by taking notice of subsurface 
and ocean depths, mountain and glacial interiors, as well as the atmosphere, thus 
build on recent scholarship by geographers that challenge “horizontalism” within 
social science research, neglecting the vertical and depth-like qualities of social 
and political life (for example, Bridge 2013; Elden 2013). Rachael Squire, in her 
analysis of Gibraltar, shows how the disputed United Kingdom overseas territory 
has been locked into an elemental struggle with Spain that encompasses more than 
the surface (Squire 2016). The seabed and offshore marine environment have been 
enrolled in rival sovereignty and security projects. In advocating a volumetric 
approach, this tranche of work reminds us that the Arctic also has the capacity to 
be filled, to expand and to contract dependent on earthly and human forces, claims, 
ambitions, ideas and interventions. An environment where digging through rock, 
chipping away at ice, drilling into glacial depths, navigating within, though, and 
under polar waters, flying through and across, as well as observing and monitoring 
Arctic skies, has profound implications for the scale, scope and intensity of human 
interventions from pursuing whales and seals, excavating coal and minerals, 
traversing across and through ice and establishing routes for aviation.
In our book The Scramble for the Poles, we take up this challenge (Dodds 
and nuttall 2016). For us, a critical Arctic geopolitics is defined as one attentive 
to the discursive and representational qualities of its subject matter, but also 
adoptive of a relational understanding of the world, which in turn is attentive to 
the connections between human and non-human elements. We therefore advocate 
a view of the Arctic as a lively space characterised by agency, change, and 
vitality. Our use of the word “scramble” was intended as provocation to highlight 
historical associations and representations of the Arctic with earlier “scrambles” 
for knowledge, appropriation of territory, colonisation of peoples, administration, 
resources and transportation. The framing of the Arctic as “resource frontier” or 
“super maritime highway” provides a particular historical trope for journalists and 
popular writers, as well as academics and policymakers. And it also marks attempts 
by human agents to stabilise, to exploit, to move through and to appropriate the 
Arctic as a place composed of ice, sea, air, rock, animals, architectures, landforms 
and people – with varying degrees of success.
The Arctic has attracted, and continues to attract, the language and imaginative 
framings of colonial expansion and settlement (and Greenland has certainly not 
been exempt from such language and framings), and to this we add that Arctic 
spaces are also lucrative and material sites for speculative capitalism. The 
resource potential of the Arctic has been actual and imagined. Animal furs and 
pelts and whale oil proved commercially lucrative in the earlier stages of that 
colonial European encounter, while ambitions to extract minerals and oil and gas 
dominate contemporary narratives concerning the “opening up of the Arctic”. 
While, however, there are numerous megaprojects around the circumpolar North 
concerned with the extraction and processing of minerals and hydrocarbons, there 
are many more at the planning stages, especially in Greenland, and although some 
are likely to be implemented, it may well be that for some corporations the Arctic 
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is more important as a frontier for speculative ventures rather than a space for 
actual resource extraction.
In this way, an extractive industry is successful in how it can raise “promissory 
capital”, as Charis Thompson (2005) terms it, i.e. capital raised on the promise 
of future returns and, in the case of mining and oil development, interventions 
in the subterranean and underground. Capital is thus not accumulated – and 
indeed, projects do not need to undergo construction and operational phases and 
resources do not necessarily have to be extracted, but the idea of extraction and 
the hype surrounding it becomes part of a political economy concerned with the 
reproduction of speculation. Projects, such as the various mining ventures at 
the exploratory stages in Greenland for instance, become important, assume a 
political life and a social presence, become central to how politicians and business 
leaders imagine the future, and are made into capital by virtue of what future 
success and profits they promise. Imagining the Arctic as a resource frontier may 
bring the future into the present though its narrative of promise and economic 
development, but it also brings apprehension and anxiety, especially to those 
indigenous communities who do not feel they have sufficient information or have 
not been consulted adequately about a project (Nuttall 2010). So a critical Arctic 
geopolitics would be attentive to the affective dimensions of social–material 
relationships and networks enveloping places like Greenland as promising, 
hopeful and rewarding. But in order to be so, we contend that a substantial body of 
knowledge produced on Greenland was emblematic of particular forms of Arctic 
geopolitics, emphasising both the depths and widths of Greenland.
Extracting the subterranean: the Greenland ice sheet as Cold 
War geopolitics
The US has long expressed a strategic interest in Greenland and other northern 
regions. As secretary of state in Abraham Lincoln’s administration, William 
Henry Seward argued the US needed to have both Greenland and Alaska within 
its national borders so that it could exercise sovereignty over the north Pacific 
and North Atlantic, and thus control the approaches to the North American 
Arctic (Hough 2013). Alaska was purchased from russia in 1867 and Seward 
continued to eye Greenland as well as Iceland. A military rationale partly inspired 
this desire, but if the territories could become American possessions Seward 
saw opportunities for exploration, mapping and ownership of resources in 
areas already claimed by Russia and British Canada. Seward could not garner 
sufficient interest in Washington DC to make a formal approach to the Danes, 
but his ideas supported exploration in the High Arctic. Following the tragedy of 
Adolphus Greely’s Arctic expedition of 1881–84 (Greely survived, but most of 
his crew perished), however, the US government ended its financing of Arctic 
exploration, and American expeditions were largely funded by private sponsors 
and geographical exploration societies for the next forty years or so (Robinson 
2006). It is also worth noting that, in 1916, during negotiations for the transfer 
(or more accurately, the sale) of the Danish West Indies to the United States, the 
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Americans accepted a demand from Copenhagen that they would not object to the 
extension of Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland.
In the aftermath of World War II, US strategic planners recognised that 
Greenland and the wider Arctic region mattered to hemispheric security. As 
they lie on the shortest route for a possible Soviet attack on the North American 
mainland, islands such as Greenland were crucial for the construction of military 
surveillance and transport systems in the Arctic. Detailed knowledge of the Arctic’s 
landscapes and seascapes was essential as planners needed better understanding 
of the impact and effect of permafrost, sea ice, glacial ice and prevailing weather 
systems on road construction and maintenance, air flights, ship and submarine 
mobility, navigation and tracking. The Greenland ice sheet was one of many 
elements of the Arctic under scientific and strategic scrutiny. Martin-nielsen has 
discussed, for example, how between 1948 and 1966 US forces in Greenland were 
entrenched in the “other cold war”. This was a struggle with the environment; the 
ice was a formidable opponent in how it acted to impede American ambitions in 
the High Arctic. Martin-nielsen argues that the Americans faced two choices: 
they could either approach the Greenland environment, and its ice sheet in 
particular, as something to conquer and control, or they could choose to enter into 
a relationship based on strategic cooperation. It was the latter approach which was 
chosen (Martin-Nielsen 2012).
Control of the North Atlantic was crucial for military and strategic advantage 
during the war and this depended on having accurate meteorological knowledge. 
Knowing what the weather was like in Greenland and the northern North Atlantic 
was vital for knowing what the weather would be like in northwest Europe a 
few days later. Greenland was placed at the centre of an assemblage of military 
and scientific technology and infrastructure, as airbases were constructed and 
manned by several thousand military personnel, and as weather stations measured 
atmospheric conditions. This Arctic was not, then, seen in horizontal terms as a 
space in which to enter, explore, traverse, and map. Greenland became important 
to how we look up into the sky and the atmosphere. Air routes and the scientific-
technological mapping and measuring of northern spaces and the control of 
meteorological knowledge placed Greenland in a new global system in which a 
volumetric geopolitics was enacted (Squire 2016).
Post-1945, the US–Danish relationship was strengthened by the decision 
by Denmark to join NATO. At the time when Roucek was writing, in 1951, 
the US military presence in Greenland was being consolidated by the Danish–
American defence agreement in the face of concerns about Soviet intentions, 
and the importance of Greenland for aerial routes and maritime surveillance in 
the North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean (Dunbar 1950; Petersen 1998). Thule Air 
base was established at Pituffik in 1951 and entailed the forced relocation of the 
Inughuit living there to Qaanaaq, 140km north, in 1953. Whereas during World 
War II Greenland’s strategic role lay in linking North America and Europe, and in 
weather forecasting, in the Cold War this role was redefined into a strategic aerial 
base for the US against the Soviet Union, and later Denmark secretly acquiesced 
to let the US station nuclear weapons at Thule.
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As the geographer Isaiah Bowman noted in 1949, “Survey, survey, and survey 
may be said to be the three basic requirements of present-day polar research, and 
we do not restrict the word to cartography” (Bowman 1949). As the Expéditions 
polaires françaises demonstrated, new endeavours were brought to bear on 
Greenland’s ice using tracked vehicles, airplanes and new scientific instruments. 
between 1949–1951, the EPF carried out hundreds of seismic and gravitational 
readings, carried out altitude measurements, and used theodolites to survey and 
map the extent of the ice sheet. The EPF’s work also represents some of the earliest 
examples of ice coring. EPF scientists in collaboration with the Danish Geodaetisk 
Institute were also interested in the mass balance of the ice sheet, the relationship 
between accumulation and ablation and thus overall ice sheet stability. The end 
result was a different kind of mapping of Greenland, emphasising the volumetric. 
An emphasis addressing the depth, the surface and volume of the ice sheet. In 
addition to the dissemination of the purely scientific data, maps of the profile and 
interior depths of Greenland were published, most spectacularly in 1956 via the 
National Geographic magazine, for public audiences.
Using cutting-edge scientific techniques, supported by an extensive logistical 
programme, and well-versed in public engagement, the research raised the profile 
of Greenland within the popular global imagination. However, growing strategic 
interest in the Arctic was something the Soviet Union and United States shared 
in the early Cold War. Soviet interest in sea ice to the north of the Russian Arctic 
coastline was matched by American investment in the ice-filled environment of 
the North American Arctic, including Greenland, and so framing the island as a 
“bastion” for the defence of the North American continent. As historians of Cold 
War science and technology have noted, investment in snow and ice research 
followed and the US Army’s Snow, Ice and Permafrost Research Establishment 
(SIPRE), which had been founded in 1949, was moved to Wilmette in Illinois 
in 1951. In 1953, Project Mint Julep was launched to investigate whether the 
southern area of the Greenland ice sheet could be used to support aircraft landing 
strips. Further north, US engineers were constructing the airbase at Thule to 
develop and sustain distance early warning capabilities, in the event of a sneak 
attack by Soviet bombers.
Further, SIPRE in their Operation Icecap, probed beneath the surface of the 
ice sheet in the north west of Greenland. SIPRE scientists, working closely with 
US Army personnel, were leading research on the movement of glacial ice, 
the properties of snow and ice, and the stability of glacial masses such as the 
Greenlandic and Antarctic ice sheets. Remarkably, Greenlandic ice was being 
transported to cold rooms at the SIPRE headquarters. Once there, scientists began 
the task of archiving the ice, measuring accumulation layers and probing the 
physical and chemical composition of the ice core.1
The calculative and investigative qualities of this ice core work had important 
implications for Arctic geopolitics. By the late 1950s, the US had established a 
series of sites for military and scientific investigation and operation including 
Thule Air Base, Camp Tuto (18 miles from the main Thule complex), Site 
2 (further east in the interior of northwest Greenland) and Camp Century (the 
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so-called “City under the Ice”). Inspired in part by the 1957–8 International 
Geophysical year, Camp Century was intended officially to be a test site for 
subsurface engineering. The engineering rationale for Camp Century was actually 
a cover-story for a more sinister project called Ice Worm, designed to facilitate 
an extraordinary complex of tracks and tunnels to store, hide and deploy nuclear 
missiles.2 Accordingly, the Greenlandic ice sheet became enrolled and implicated 
in a strategic investment to use the dynamic qualities of snow and ice to conceal 
US missiles. The material geographies of Greenland, its ice, seabed and snow, 
and its rocks and minerals, are central to any geopolitical auditing of Cold War 
Arctic geopolitics and beyond. The interior of Greenland also became bound up 
with a popular culture that amazed North American and European audiences, as 
the US Army revealed in its work when building the “city under the ice” at Camp 
Century (SIPRE scientists were key participants in the project) (Kinney 2013).
The lively materiality and movement of ice proved to be the downfall of Project 
Ice Worm. By the mid-1960s, ice deformation was compromising the safety of 
the tunnel network and the growing importance of US submarines as a mobile 
missile nuclear force compromised its strategic value. The digging, moving, 
manipulating, and managing of mobile ice overwhelmed American engineers 
while the mobility of another object (the submarine) gave new opportunities 
to circumvent the material constraints of Greenlandic terrestrial ice. The Cold 
War was dominated by interest in onshore Greenland as an icy platform for US 
strategic operations, while for the Danes it emerged as a possible resource frontier 
for significant minerals such as uranium. The marine geographies of Greenland 
also captured interest.
From being framed as a possible strategic/geographical gap (the Greenland-
Iceland-United-Kingdom (GIUK) gap) in the Cold War, the last decade has 
witnessed a growing appreciation of how to think of Greenland as possessing 
a stretchable quality with implications for the sovereign rights of Denmark/
Greenland, its position as an Arctic nation, as well as Greenland’s aspirations 
for nation-building and state formation (Nuttall 2014). Precisely when Greenland 
appears to be more confident in asserting greater economic and political 
autonomy, Denmark has moved to declare its position as a major Arctic state 
with a significant role in international diplomacy. ocean depths and subsurface 
geological environments are important for the Kingdom of Denmark as an Arctic 
state whereas they assume quite different meanings for Greenlandic ambitions for 
independence. This stretchable quality of Greenland has implications in territorial 
and geopolitical ways – some for the consolidation of an Arctic state, some for 
the creation of a new Arctic state. Geologists and oceanographers have been 
integral to the mapping and making of offshore Greenland, the development of 
an emerging oil/gas sector, and an island with extended outer continental shelves, 
stretching all the way to the central Arctic Ocean. At the same time in Greenland, 
the government of Greenland’s Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources 
supports the gathering of geo-data through its department of geology to inform 
strategy-making, licensing, and the marketing of mineral resources for economic 
development.
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Probing the Greenlandic seabed: Denmark as “Arctic state”
The russian flag planting on the Arctic ocean seabed in 2007 attracted attention 
because it employed a self-knowing colonial-imperial gesture of marking 
territory through the importation of a flag to a place far from human settlement. 
Dismissed by some as a publicity stunt and declared irrelevant under international 
law, it nonetheless unleashed a tsunami of commentary about “Arctic scrambles”, 
suggesting that many instinctively understood the discursive-material significance 
of an event occurring far below the water, on the seabed and seen through the 
window of a submersible. The private provenance of the expedition added further 
intrigue to the expedition and possible Russian intentions towards the Arctic 
Ocean. Was Russia about to stake a claim to this oceanic space? Or was it a display 
of technological-exploratory chutzpah akin, as Russian commentators suggested, 
to the United States planting a flag on the surface of the moon in 1969? What 
the event demonstrated, though, was a different register of Arctic geopolitics to 
the one of Cold War Greenland. Rather than the ice sheet, the seabed becomes 
productive of the geopolitical. Exploring the depths of the Arctic continental shelf 
and submarine rights has emerged as a crucial element in the sovereignty politics 
of the Arctic Ocean. Legal regimes such as the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) have become conduits for bringing subterranean knowledge to 
the surface in order to justify and legitimate the Arctic Ocean costal states roles.
In 2008, the five coastal states agreed to the Ilulissat Declaration, reiterating 
their collective desire to manage, in an orderly fashion, and within existing 
international legal frameworks, the issues and changes affecting the Arctic ocean 
from climate change to shipping and fishing. The intervention was decisive in 
using international legal and geographical categories to establish, what in critical 
race studies is termed, a “somatic norm” – a naturalised domain for some people/
bodies/ideas/states as opposed to others (Puwar 2001). The “somatic norm” at 
play revolves around the five Arctic ocean coastal states stating that they are 
the rightful symbolic and geophysical occupiers of the maritime Arctic region. 
Using geographical proximity, discussions of Arctic geopolitics and governance 
privileges these states and their interests. Conversely “space invaders” in the form 
of other states and communities play a disturbing role in this space. Proximity, 
in this context, is working on two registers; geographical/geophysical and racial.
Geographically the Ilulissat Declaration privileged some Arctic states with 
Finland, Iceland and Sweden not being invited to the meeting. Racially, the 
Declaration was accompanied by a ceremony highlighting the role of white men as 
representatives of those five Arctic ocean coastal states. no representatives from 
indigenous peoples’ organisations were invited to participate let alone endorse the 
Declaration (a criticism levelled at the meeting by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, 
which later organised its own summit with a declaration on Inuit sovereignty). 
Although the Greenlandic premier Hans Enoksen was there, as were other 
Greenlandic politicians, they were participants as part of a state delegation rather 
than as representation of any assertions of indigeneity. The Ilulissat Declaration 
codes Arctic coastal states, and their white representatives, as a naturalised norm 
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with the affect of making non-white bodies and non-coastal states (albeit with very 
different experiences and trajectories) unwelcome and alien, as well as ignoring 
and even erasing the presence of indigenous peoples.
The Danish government convened the meeting and selected the Greenlandic 
town of Ilulissat, a symbol of rapid climate change and tipping points. It did 
so against a backdrop of concerns about global climate change and a desire to 
promote its role as an Arctic Ocean coastal state, courtesy of Greenland. Six 
months later, Greenland hosted a referendum, which confirmed a popular desire 
for autonomy and further self-government including rights to administer and 
exploit the island’s subsurface resources. Enacted in 2009 this ushered in a new 
era of Government of Greenland controlled mineral licensing in coastal lands 
and offshore licensed drilling zones nuttall, 2012). As Greenlandic voters were 
casting their votes, representatives from Inuit and other indigenous communities 
met at the Inuit Leaders’ Summit in Kuujjuaq, Nunavik, Canada to express their 
views about the Ilulissat Declaration in their own Circumpolar Inuit Declaration 
on Sovereignty in the Arctic:
On 7 November, International Inuit Day, we expressed unity in our concerns 
over Arctic sovereignty deliberations, examined the options for addressing 
these concerns, and strongly committed to developing a formal declaration 
on Arctic sovereignty. We also noted that the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration on 
Arctic sovereignty by ministers representing the five coastal Arctic states 
did not go far enough in affirming the rights Inuit have gained through 
international law, land claims and self-government processes.
(Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2009)
Rather than “not go[ing] far enough” perhaps what they actually did do was to 
go deeper into the ocean and further offshore to cement their sovereign rights in the 
Arctic Ocean. While the Inuit Leaders’ Summit manifested indigenous autonomy 
in the form of international legal recognition and land claims, the Arctic Five (A5) 
were codifying themselves as volumetric occupiers of the maritime Arctic region.
Arctic governance and geopolitics was further “tested” in the ministerial meeting 
of the Arctic Council in Nuuk in 2011 when the Arctic states and permanent 
participants considered the question of whether further states and organisations 
should be admitted as “observers” to the forum. Encouraged by Nordic member 
states, predominantly Asian countries such as China, Japan and South Korea 
had expressed interest in joining an overwhelmingly European group of existing 
observers. The ministerial meeting agreed to new guidelines, ensuring that all 
observers would have to recognise formally the sovereign rights of the eight Arctic 
states as well as the rights of their indigenous communities. Designed to reconcile the 
Arctic states A8 and A5 and Arctic communities (indigenous and non-indigenous), 
new rules of engagement with old and new observers were agreed upon. However, 
the admittance of new nation state observers in 2013, led to concerns from permanent 
participants that their collective voice and influence might be disrupted and even 
diluted by a reassertion of traditional state-centric governance.
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The reassertion of state-centric governance in the Arctic has also manifested 
itself through scientific knowledge and practice about Arctic ice and seas. 
Governance, geopolitics and geophysics have co-constituted one another. The 
intersection of science and geopolitics in the Arctic remains significant in spaces 
and in areas such as the ocean depths and seabed. Science is a powerful mode of 
governance complicit with claims to authority and governance. The five coastal 
states have invested millions of dollars, roubles and kroner in the mapping of the 
continental shelves and seabed to demarcate the outer limits of their sovereign 
rights in the Arctic Ocean. These mapping projects become accomplices to 
traditional state-centric power, producing an Arctic geopolitics, which privileges 
the rights of the coastal state and the cartographic conventions of the modern 
nation-state. Denmark and its specialist agencies such as the Geological Survey 
of Denmark and Greenland in collaboration with international partners (including 
Sweden, Russia and Canada) remains active in mapping, charting and promoting 
this geo-vision of the Arctic Ocean as the rightful space of coastal states, as 
legitimated by the UNCLOS. The place of Greenland and its communities, 
however, remains ambivalent in this Arctic geopolitics. Made complicit with the 
ambitions of Denmark as coastal state and key Arctic player, most notably in 
declarations and articulations of Arctic political and cultural identity evident in 
the Kingdom of Denmark’s Arctic strategy, in Danish submissions to the United 
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLSC), and with 
increased funding for Danish Arctic research (Nuttall 2014), it is also a complex 
space with colonial encounters and Cold War histories and geographies, as we 
outlined earlier.
Without the continued constitutional relationship with Greenland, Denmark’s 
identity as an Arctic Ocean coastal state would be jeopardised. Consequently, 
Denmark’s “Arctic activism” (Rosamond 2015), combining a strong emphasis 
on Danish military presence allied with a public commitment to multilateralism 
and its special relationship with Greenland, needs to be seen in relation to the 
stakes at play for Danish sovereignty and identity. The Danish invitation to 
convene a meeting in Greenland also has local origins in Danish–Greenlandic 
politics. The then Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller was deeply involved 
in climate-change diplomacy and had been active in launching a “Greenland 
dialogue” in 2005, which sought to draw attention at ministerial level to the 
implications of climate change for Arctic environments. In 2007, he warned 
an audience in London that climate change was geopolitically significant with 
implications for Arctic resource extraction, shipping, maritime policing and 
territorial ownership. Two months later, “evidence” for possible tension could 
be found in the russian flag planting. The “scramble for the Arctic” discourse 
had begun in earnest, and the fate of the Greenlandic ice sheet has since been at 
the epicentre of popular and political discourse, as well as scientific narratives, 
about a warming world.
The Danish submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS) was delivered in 2014 and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Martin 
Lidegaard noted at the time that:
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The submission of our claim to the continental shelf north of Greenland is a 
historic and important milestone for the Kingdom of Denmark. The objective 
of this huge project is to define the outer limits of our continental shelf and 
thereby – ultimately – of the Kingdom of Denmark.
 (Government of Denmark 2014)
Within the submission, the Danish government contended that the Lomonosov 
Ridge, which extends some 1100 miles across the Arctic Ocean and dividing into 
the Eurasia and Amerasia basins, is “both morphologically and geologically an 
integral part of the Northern Continental Margin of Greenland”. The submission 
suggested that the outer continental shelf from the baselines of Greenland covers 
some 895,000 square kilometres. The Lomonosov Ridge is one area of the Arctic 
ocean seabed that is of great interest to not just to Denmark – the submission 
overlaps with the Canadian, Norwegian, Russian submissions to the CLCS. The 
extent of sovereign rights over the seabed is still to be determined but is likely 
to extend at least 350 nautical miles beyond the coastal baseline, and possibly 
further. The eventual settlement of outer continental shelf delimitation will involve 
multinational negotiation regardless of any recommendations from the CLCS. 
What this process might eventually reveal, however, is the outer limits of how 
the territorial extent of an independent Greenland may look like; an Arctic state 
stretching possibly to the North Pole itself, and an entity with its own sovereign 
rights over the exclusive economic zone and vast area of continental shelf.
Conclusion
For a time, Arctic geopolitics became rapidly reassembled around the politics of 
fear and even dread within a context of rapid climate change, sovereignty and 
territorial claims. Articles and books appeared with warnings about weak Arctic 
governance, resource and territorial scrambles, a “Cold Rush”, and a “New Great 
Game” (e.g. Potapov and Sale 2009). The central Arctic ocean – and what lies 
within and deep below it – was one such area. This subterranean territory invited 
a new era of colonial mapping, exploitation and administration. Informed by 
international law, attention turned to the provisions that allowed the coastal states 
to extend their sovereign rights to the outer continental shelves of their national 
territories. Defining themselves as an Arctic 5, Canada, Denmark/Greenland, 
Norway, Russia and United States reimagined themselves as coastal states with 
substantial interests and rights in the Arctic Ocean.
Between 2008 and 2015, the Arctic Ocean coastal states have reinforced their 
special geographical relationship. While the seabed has been a very powerful 
material marker of that relationship, in more recent years the fate of the high 
seas of the central Arctic Ocean has provided further incentive. In 2014, Nuuk 
was host to a meeting on potential fishing activity in the central Arctic ocean, 
which later led to an agreement by the coastal states to prohibit their vessels from 
fishing in the region until a regional fisheries agreement is in place including 
extra-territorial actors such as China, South Korea and the European Union.
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The net result has been to reinforce, according to some Danish observers, a 
view of the Kingdom of Denmark as a “middle power” with a vested interest in 
the governance of the Arctic Ocean. Greenland’s geographical qualities are clearly 
critical to this in terms of identification of Denmark/Greenland as a coastal state 
with specific sovereign rights. What complicates this understanding is the growing 
autonomy of the government of Greenland (self-government) and its formal 
competence to take ownership and control over its subsurface resources both on 
and offshore. Granted home rule in 1979, the introduction of self-government in 
June 2009 has been followed by increasing desires for greater autonomy from 
Denmark in which discussion of foreign and security policy often come to the 
fore. The 2011 Strategy for the Arctic reinforced the role of the Danish military in 
terms of protecting Danish sovereignty in Greenland and the wider Arctic region.
Greenlandic politics has been closely influenced by the role and extent of the 
extractive sector and whether the government of Greenland should be working more 
closely with foreign companies and investors to help generate revenue streams, to 
help fund a shift away from economic reliance on Denmark. Resource stakeholders 
(politicians, government bodies and institutions, local businesses, multinational 
companies) are imagining and making the resource frontier in Greenland, and the 
extractive industries are re-imaging onshore and offshore areas as being of great 
potential, as part of a wider trans-national “New North” closely connected to the 
world economy (Nuttall 2012; 2013). Despite a dip in global commodity prices, as 
well as other global processes, the subterranean and the ocean depths nonetheless 
remain critical for Greenlandic notions of nation-building and state formation. Plans 
for mining and oil development projects, even with their accompanying social and 
environmental impact assessments, as well as discussions of the environmental and 
social impacts of seismic surveys and mineralogical mappings, involve extractivist 
discourses and spatial technologies of power that privilege particular techno-centric 
and economic views of the Greenlandic environment and do not take into account 
local community perspectives on human–environment relations (nuttall 2015). 
Particular places become emptied of human presence and activity and are reimagined 
as resource spaces marked out for economic development and accompanying 
ambitions for Greenlandic state formation. Within the discursive space created by 
the idea and formulation of a resource frontier as a “zone of unmapping”, to use 
Anna Tsing’s phrasing (2000), a diverse range of actors have become engaged in the 
production, mediation and reproduction of different kinds of Greenlandic futures, 
something which involves a new mapping and classification of Greenlandic spaces 
filled with possibility, opportunity and ambition. While it has become a stated 
aim of recent Greenlandic governments to “extract” revenue from hydrocarbon 
projects, mining activities and energy and industrial development, official plans 
have provoked highly charged political and social debates within Greenland about 
the nature and desirability of such a development and how it may redefine the nature 
of place and territory. At the same time, contested perceptions and understandings 
of the environment have become increasingly apparent with concerns expressed by 
local people and grassroots organisations, as well as international environmental 
and conservation groups, about threats to community viability, to wildlife and to 
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biodiversity. Local understandings of human–environment relations are ignored, 
especially within social and environmental impact assessments for possible projects, 
and local experience and knowledge, as well as local histories of past mining 
activities, are erased by the production of technical knowledge and in political and 
industry discourses about Greenlandic environments and subsurface resources.
All of this has social and political implications within Greenland, as well as 
for relationships within the Kingdom of Denmark, and for Greenland’s place in 
the world. As we have argued in this chapter, to locate Greenland within a critical 
geopolitics involves a consideration of the science and politics of and about ice, 
land and water, as well as the subsurface and Greenland’s depths and widths: 
this is vital for contemporary understanding of how the subsurface is imagined, 
probed, mapped and politicised, how territory is thought about, and what happens 
at the intersection of both Greenlandic political discourse and extractive industry 
narratives surrounding resource development and its possibilities, the emergent 
public responses to it and the growth of social movements and assemblage of 
local protest, debates over decision-making processes and the extent and nature of 
public participation, and the growing influence of corporate transnationalism over 
Greenlandic politics and even everyday life (Nuttall 2015). Our concern with how 
Greenland is not just placed but how it is materialised within a critical geopolitics, 
however, also illustrates a broader process of the reimagining of the Arctic as 
a resource frontier and a space for economic possibility, and the way in which 
ice sheets, mountains, waterways, ocean depths and subterranean geologies are 
enrolled in geopolitical imaginaries and narrative concerning resource futures, 
and the hopes and ambitions, as well as the anxieties and resistances to which this 
gives rise.
Notes
 1 In 1961, SIPrE was merged with the Arctic Construction and Frost Effects Laboratory 
to create a Cold regions research and Engineering Laboratory based in Hanover, 
nH.
 2 There was a substantial European–US partnership in Greenland ice core research 
between the 1950s and 1980s. See (Elzinga, 2011) 
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